Since its passage in 1947, the Supreme Court has understood Section 301(a) of 
I. Introduction
parameters. The rich history of Section 301(a) has afforded the Supreme Court ample opportunity to interpret its purpose and reach. 4 Section 301(a)'s aim was to confer jurisdiction on federal courts in suits between employers and unions. 5 But soon after its passage, the Court's interpretation of the Act accentuated an additional policy goal flowing from the statute: stability in the collective bargaining process. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court found that Section 301(a) did not merely "confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations," but also "expresse [d] a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements [in order to achieve] industrial peace." 6 By interpreting the Act as a "congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to . . . address disputes arising out of labor contracts" 7 the Court took it upon itself to stabilize relationships between employers and unions.
Fifteen years after the Act's passage, contractual stability between unions and employers continued to be an underlying concern when the Court in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. explained the necessity behind federal uniformity in collective bargaining disputes: " [t] he possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements." 8 Different state and federal interpretations could prolong disputes and act as a contracting disincentive. 9 Throughout these decisions, the Court's core commitment to stability within the collective bargaining process has guided its 301(a) jurisprudence.
Although the majority spent more time addressing the availability of options Granite Rock might still pursue --as opposed to explaining why the Court did not endorse the claim for tortious interference of contract--the Court made it clear that " [t] he balance federal statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-bargaining arena is carefully calibrated." 10 Consequently, the Court found that "creating a federal common-law tort cause of action [under 301(a) ] would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this balance." 11 The majority went no further, seeing no need to determine whether Section 301(a) represented a Congressional mandate to create a body of federal tort law regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1174 (citing to the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 10th circuits).
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed Granite Rock's assertion that a federal tort claim was cognizable under Section 301(a). 35 The court of appeals stated that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 301(a) as "a mandate to create a federal common law of labor contract interpretation, not an independent body of tort law." 36 As to satisfying the second element of Section 301(a), Granite Rock argued that "because breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious interference claim, the resolution of the tort claim is 'focused upon' and 'governed by' the contract."
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In addition, Granite Rock pointed to the "close relationship" between Local 287 and IBT to highlight the benefit that IBT gained by the Local's breach. The court noted the argument's "emotive force," but found that Granite Rock's argument lacked precedential support. at an entire contract. 41 It noted that all challenges to the validity of the contract are to be considered by the arbitrator, while only courts may consider challenges to the arbitration clause. 42 Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that because Granite Rock failed to make an independent challenge to the arbitration clause, Granite Rock could not challenge its validity through a general breach of contract action. 43 Granite Rock argued that Local 287 should be estopped from asserting the arbitration clause in the first place because Local 287 disputed that a contract between the parties had ever been formed.
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However, the court found that it had already rejected similar arguments made in Teldyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 45 where the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's claim in order to avoid the "absurd" result of finding for the validity of a contract while ignoring its arbitration provision. 46 Ultimately, the court found that both parties consented to arbitration-Granite Rock doing so" implicitly by bringing suit under the contract containing the clause" and Local 287 "explicitly by asserting the arbitration clause." Thomas explained that if the question was not whether "when" the contract was formed but "if" the contract was formed, this case would be easily decided. 54 In cases determining "if" a contract is formed, that issue would go to a court to decide, because it would be absurd for a defendant to be forced to arbitrate rights and liabilities of a contract to which he was not bound. However, the court distinguishes the issue as atypical, in that this dispute centered on "when," not whether, Local 287 ratified the CBA. The issue is important because Granite Rock asserts that the contract, which contained a no-strike clause, was formed before Local 287 went on strike, and therefore, rendering Local 287 in breach of the contract. Local 287 asserts that the same contract was not formed before the strike, but afterwards; therefore, Local 287 should not be held liable for breach of contract when it went on strike.
Compelling arbitration of a particular issue is appropriate in situations when both parties agree to arbitration. 55 When the parties agree to arbitrate a certain issue, they are doing so with the assumption that the arbitrator will decide the case within the framework of the valid contract. Therefore, the parties assume that the provisions of the valid contract will be used, that the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the contract will be determined by the contract, including when those rights and responsibilities come into existence. These determinations cannot be answered without first answering when the rights and responsibilities came into existence, i. ." While the district court dismissed the federal tort cause of action for failure to state a claim, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a claim for tortious interference of contract was cognizable under 301(a).The court found that 301(a) "reaches not only suits on labor contracts, but suits seeking remedies for violation of such contracts." Furthermore, the court found its conclusion consistent with the Supreme Court's 301(a) jurisprudence. In his opinion, Judge Gibbons noted that Supreme Court precedent suggested that 301(a) should be read broadly, as "[a]ll suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements are governed by federal law." More telling, however, was the court's adherence to preserving uniformity within the collective bargaining arena. The court was less concerned whether the remedy was labeled as one of contract or one of tort; rather it found that " [a] holding that tortious interference with a collective bargaining agreement is not a matter governed by federal law would leave open the possibility of lack of uniformity in scope of obligation which the Court in Lucas Flour sought to prevent . . . ."Lastly, the court of appeals noted that the regulation of tortious interference claims "does not involve an area traditionally relegated to the states," as the essence of the claim originates from federal common law governing labor agreements.
uncertainty to the issue given Third Circuit precedent 96 and the complete lack of Congressional interest in clarifying the statute.
The Court, in its attempt to preserve the careful calibration "federal statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-bargaining arena," may actually have unwittingly achieved the opposite effect. The Court should have followed Justice
Sotomayor's pragmatic approach to the arbitrability issue, highlighting her adherence to the landmark principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy."
The consistent theme in Supreme Court precedent addressing Section 301(a) is federal uniformity within the collective bargaining sphere. However convenient a ruling on this issue would have been, by failing to make a definitive decision about whether a federal tort claim is cognizable under 301(a), the Court in Granite Rock strayed from its commitment to stability.
It is ironic that Justice Thomas used the word "premature" to characterize why the time was not right to recognize a "federal common law tort." 97 The time was right either to recognize this claim or entirely foreclose the possibility of parties invoking it in the future. Yet in the name of preserving stability, the Court sounds tentative. In this case, the Ninth Circuit was hesitant to trespass on Congress' turf regarding the scope of Section 301(a). That court maintained that it was not the duty of the courts, but of 96 Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Build Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 1981) Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 546 F.3d 1169 , 1174 (9th Cir. 2008 Despite this flaw, she did recognize that adherence to some of the salient principles of the Trilogy carry greater weight in this case than blind commitment to procedure.
In failing to rule definitively on the tort dimension, the Court not only lost an opportunity to clarify a circuit split, albeit a lopsided one, but also continued to muddy the water surrounding the precise scope of 301(a). As a result, by trying to preserve the and that Third Circuit precedent strays from the other courts in that it recognizes tortious interference for this type of conduct, it left the tortious interference question unanswered for the sake of judicial restraint. Because the Court found it premature to clarify a sixtythree year old law, fifty years after the Steelworkers Trilogy provided the foundations for it to do so, the Court left the federal courts with uncertainty.
At the same moment, the Court failed to recognize that CBAs are more than just contracts. They are generalized codes to govern a myriad of cases which draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. Parties to a CBA thus do not merely contract between themselves; they agree to be participants in a system that promotes arbitration.
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor takes a more traditional approach. In her opinion, when both parties signed the CBA, which essentially predated the July strike, they both agreed to arbitrate any issues that might arise out of their agreement, no matter how convoluted the facts may be. In doing so, she retains the values that the Steelworkers Trilogy presents: that no draftsman could have anticipated this dispute and that any doubts to arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitrability. But because her opinion is of the minority, the core values of the Steelworkers Trilogy are ignored, and judicial uncertainty remains.
CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-three years, both the Ninth Circuit, 112 explicitly, and the 113 Xaros v. U. S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1987) .
language in doing so. After making references to the "host of policy choices" that could upset the balance 301(a) has strived to maintain between unions and employers, the Court went no further, apparently finding that the parties' briefs did a good enough job explaining those "important" balance disrupters. Furthermore, the Court used the word "premature" to label Granite Rock's request to expand 301(a)'s scope. While the Court may have found it premature given the direction and general agreement among the circuits, concluding its discussion on the issue in this way left 301(a)'s scope more open than the Court may have wanted.
This issue of whether a tortious interference of contract claim has a place in federal common law will continue to arise in collective bargaining disputes similar to the one that occurred between Granite Rock and IBT, as a parent union's participation in a dispute involving a local branch is not uncommon. Thus, this was an issue ripe for the Court's clarification. An in depth discussion of whether a tortious interference of contract claim is cognizable under 301(a) must be reserved for another day.
114 114 Similar to the paucity of courts favoring a federal tort claim, the number of articles in support of this expansion of 301(a) is also lacking. After an extensive search on Lexis, we were unable to find one article proposing a tortious interference of contract claim to be cognizable under 301(a). One article appeared to support that claim given its title, but after further review, it opposed expanding 301(a) to "provide a federal tort claim against interfering third parties." Elizabeth Z. 
